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son begins with preferences over complex acts, but they have retained the blind belief that chance models are always appropriate standards for comparison and calibration and that a person's basic preferences must determine a simple ordering.

Consider Raiffa's description of his constructive approach in Decision Analysis (1968, pp. 127-218):

Nowhere in our analysis did we refer to the behavior of an "idealized, rational, economic man" who always acts in a perfectly consistent manner as if somehow there were embedded in his very soul coherent utility and probability evaluations for all eventualities. Rather, our approach has been *constructive*: We have prescribed the way in which an individual who is faced with a problem of choice under uncertainty should go about choosing an act that is consistent with his basic judgments and preferences.

Is a theory that prescribes the way to deal with a problem of choice truly constructive?

I would like to suggest that a theory of decision is not truly constructive unless it recognizes the need for judgment and choice at every level. Construction involves not only choice from a set of canonical examples but also the choice of a set of canonical examples. It involves not only decisions on particular preferences but also decisions on what structure for values is appropriate for a particular problem.

